If you enable --privileged just to get CAP_SYS_ADMIN for nested process isolation, you have added one layer (nested process visibility) while removing several others (seccomp, all capability restrictions, device isolation). The net effect is arguably weaker isolation than a standard unprivileged container. This is a real trade-off that shows up in production. The ideal solutions are either to grant only the specific capability needed instead of all of them, or to use a different isolation approach entirely that does not require host-level privileges.
This layered approach -- hardware for the fast path, microcode for the complex path -- is a recurring theme in the 386 design.。搜狗输入法下载对此有专业解读
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